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I. INTRODUCTION
Although you cannot take it with you when you go, American succession
laws permit the next best thing—the power to decide who will receive your
possessions when you are gone.1 This notion of fulfilling donative intent
permeates American probate laws, and its breadth is nearly unparalleled by
any other modern legal system.2 Policymakers have gone to great lengths to
ensure that probate procedures accommodate the freedom of disposition, only
permitting outright restraints in certain limited circumstances.3 So, testators
can rest easy knowing their property will be dispersed according to their wishes,
right? Unfortunately, there may still be cause for concern. Over time, states have
unwittingly undermined donative intent by attempting to balance the freedom of

* J.D. candidate, University of Wyoming College of Law, Class of 2019. Special thanks to
Julianne Gern for introducing me to this opinion, as well as to Professor Mark Glover for his
feedback and suggestions.
1

JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 2 (10th ed. 2017).

2

Id. at 4.

3
Id. (“[F]reedom of disposition at death is curbed only by wealth transfer taxation[,] . . .
the forced share for a surviving spouse[,] . . . rules protecting creditors[,] . . . [and] public policy
constraints such as the Rule Against Perpetuities, the rule against trusts for capricious purposes, and
the rule against restraints on alienation.”).
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disposition with other interests.4 This has called into question the legitimacy of
the American premise that “freedom of disposition is paramount and the courts
have no power to deviate from a person’s will.”5
The Wyoming Supreme Court recently grappled with this dilemma in the
context of ancillary probate administration.6 In Lon V. Smith Foundation v. Devon
Energy Corp., the Wyoming Supreme Court settled a controversy between named
beneficiaries as to the rightful ownership of certain Wyoming real property
listed within a testator’s will.7 The dispute resolution focused primarily on a
determination of which instrument—the testator’s will or a conflicting foreign
decree adopted during ancillary probate administration proceedings—governed
the disposition of the estate’s assets.8 This case presented an opportunity for the
Wyoming Supreme Court to examine the interplay between Wyoming’s interest
in upholding the freedom of disposition and the efficient operation of ancillary
probate proceedings under Wyoming Statute § 2-11-201.9 The court ultimately
concluded that the foreign probate decree adopted by the Natrona County District
Court pursuant to Wyoming Statute § 2-11-201 controlled the distribution of
Wyoming real property, notwithstanding the decree’s failure to distribute the real
property in accordance with the testator’s will.10
This case note examines concerns stemming from the operation of
Wyoming ancillary probate statutes as seen through the Wyoming Supreme
Court’s holding. It first provides a brief description of the history behind
Wyoming probate laws, followed by a discussion of the ancillary administration
proceedings available in Wyoming.11 Next, it gives a summary of the facts,
holding, and analysis in Lon V. Smith Foundation v. Devon Energy Corp.12 It argues
the court’s holding in Lon V. Smith Foundation was correct based upon the present
language of Wyoming Statute § 2-11-201 and general probate principles.13
However, this case note further argues that Wyoming Statute § 2-11-201, as

4
THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 88.13(d)(3)(i) (David A. Thomas ed., 3d ed. 2017).
Efficiency is often the primary competing interest, in light of the growing consensus that probate is
“costly and time-consuming.” Id.
5
RAY D. MADOFF, IMMORTALITY
6–7 (2010).

AND THE

LAW: THE RISING POWER

OF THE

AMERICAN DEAD

6
See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 142–210. This issue also frequently arises in
connection with will formalities. See id.
7

Lon V. Smith Found. v. Devon Energy Corp., 2017 WY 121, 403 P.3d 997 (Wyo. 2017).

8

Id.

9

Id.

10

Id. ¶ 39, 403 P.3d at 1009.

11

See infra notes 16 – 87 and accompanying text.

12

See infra notes 88 –148 and accompanying text.

13

See infra notes 149–87 and accompanying text.
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applied, incorrectly favors efficiency at the expense of accurately fulfilling the
testator’s intent.14 Finally, this case note examines the legislative response to the
principal case’s application of Wyoming Statute § 2-11-201 and proposes an
amendment to the statute.15

II. BACKGROUND
A. History of Wyoming Probate Law
The term “probate” refers to the actions of validating a will and administering
a decedent’s estate in a probate court.16 The concept of monitoring succession
of property upon death in this fashion has origins in English law, first used by
ecclesiastical courts after the Norman Conquest in 1066 A.D.17 The colonies later
adopted these concepts during the sixteenth century, and they have carried on
into modern American jurisprudence.18 Today, the practice of examining a will
and administering an estate is firmly established and follows a similar process in
every state.19 However, the mechanics of probate proceedings are controlled by
each state’s statutes and court rules, which vary greatly.20 Careful consideration
of applicable state probate law is therefore imperative to both prospective estate
planning and retroactive estate distribution.21
Wyoming probate law has evolved sporadically. President Andrew Johnson
first recognized Wyoming as a U.S. territory in 1868.22 Shortly thereafter, the
first legislative assembly enacted intestacy provisions.23 However, it was not until
after induction as a state—twenty-two years later—that the first state legislature
of Wyoming passed the Wyoming Probate Procedure Act.24 The substantive basis

14

See infra notes 188–223 and accompanying text.

15

See infra notes 224–43 and accompanying text.

16

Probate, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th Pocket ed. 2016).

Eugene A. Haertle, The History of the Probate Court, 45 MARQ. L. REV. 546, 546 (1962)
(providing a more in-depth analysis of the origins of probate).
17

18

See id. at 548, 551.

19

DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 44.

Id. Wyoming’s probate procedures are presently governed under Title 2 of the Wyoming
Statutes, entitled Wills, Decedent’s Estates and Probate Code. WYO. STAT. ANN. tit. 2 (2017). This
Title contains eighteen Chapters, each of which addresses various technical components of estate
distribution and interpretation. Id.
20

21

DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 44.

Debora A. Person, Wyoming Pre-Statehood Legal Materials: An Annotated Bibliography—
Part II, 7 WYO. L. REV. 333, 375 (2007).
22

23
Lawrence H. Averill, Jr., Wyoming’s Law of Decedents’ Estates, Guardianship and Trusts:
A Comparison with the Uniform Probate Code—Part I, IX LAND & WATER L. REV. 172 (1974)
[hereinafter Wyoming’s Law—Part I].
24

Id. at 172–73.
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for this Act was derived primarily from portions of the California Code of Civil
Procedure of 1872.25 Consequently, a large body of Wyoming case law has given
deference to California court interpretations of the language underlying this Act.26
The probate procedures set forth in the Act remained substantially unchallenged
until 1969, when the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws approved the Uniform Probate Code (UPC).27 The UPC is a culmination of
extensive research and discussion in the area of decedents’ estates, guardianships,
and trusts by leading experts, who drafted their findings into a model code over a
period of six years.28 Once approved, several states sought to replace their current
probate statutes through adoption of this model code, including Wyoming.29
Following the national trend, in 1975, the 43rd Wyoming Legislature
proposed and passed the UPC as a replacement to the Wyoming Probate Procedure
Act.30 However, Governor Ed Herschler quickly vetoed this modification that
same year.31 Governor Herschler cited various reasons for his veto, including
uniformity concerns, an absence of input by the trust profession, and burdensome impacts on courts.32 Additionally, he expressed his confidence in the
operation of Wyoming’s system at that time.33 The 44th Wyoming Legislature
made a second attempt to pass the UPC in 1977, but, again, Governor Hershler
vetoed it.34 In the wake of these failed revision attempts, the Wyoming Probate
Procedure Act governed administration of Wyoming estates until 1979, at which
time the 45th Wyoming State Legislature enacted the Wyoming Probate Code of

25
Id. at 173 n.20. The probate portions of the California Code of Civil Procedure of
1872 were an updated version of the California Probate Act of 1851, which likely originated out
of Texas. Id.
26
See, e.g., Merrill v. Dist. Court of Fifth Judicial Dist., 272 P.2d 597, 598 (Wyo. 1954); In
re Estate of Kimball, 583 P.2d 1274, 1279 (Wyo. 1978).
27
Ann Bradford Stevens, Uniform Probate Code Procedures: Time for Wyoming to Reconsider, 2
WYO. L. REV. 293, 294 (2002).
28

Averill, Wyoming’s Law—Part I, supra note 23, at 174–75.

Stevens, supra note 27, at 294 n.11, 297 n.23. (listing those states which have presently
adopted the UPC in substantially unaltered form as: Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana,
Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, and Utah); Steven D. Lerner, The Need for Reform in
Multistate Estate Administration, 55 TEX. L. REV. 303, 304 n.7 (1977).
29

30

Stevens, supra note 27, at 294.

31

Id. 294 –95.

Id. The justifications for Governor Hershler’s veto appear to be unfounded. See id. UPC
drafters, including members of the trust profession, designed the Code to operate as a uniform
approach to streamlining probate procedures. Id. Wyoming’s failure to adopt the UPC ultimately
set it apart from neighboring western states—by 1975, the UPC had already been adopted by
Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, and Utah. Id. at 293, 294 n.11.
32

33

Id. at 294 –95.

34

Id. at 295 n.13.
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1979.35 Alterations to the Probate Code of 1979 were modeled after provisions of
the Uniform Probate Code and the Iowa Probate Code.36
Complaints about the new probate code arose soon after its enactment.37
Opponents argued it suffered from both “technical and substantive problems.”38
In response, the 45th Wyoming State Legislature passed an amended version of
the 1979 Code during their second legislative session.39 On April 1, 1980, this
amended probate code, now known as the Probate Code of 1980, went into effect.40
The 1980 Code amended, repealed, and renumbered the previous provisions of
the 1979 Code.41 Although the Probate Code of 1980 reorganized and enacted
changes to previous estate administration procedures, in many respects, the
general process of administering an estate in Wyoming did not become any more
streamlined under the new Code.42 Consequently, Wyoming courts and scholars
alike have suggested state legislators should revisit, and perhaps rethink, the 1980
Code.43 Aside from a handful of amendments and additions, the Probate Code
of 1980 was the last substantive review of the Wyoming Probate Code by the
Wyoming legislature.44

B. Ancillary Administration
Perhaps one of the most important functions state probate laws fulfill is
delineating the process an executor or personal representative must undertake

Lawrence H. Averill, Jr., The Wyoming Probate Code of 1980: An Analysis and Critique, XVI
LAND & WATER L. REV. No. 1, 103, 105–06 (1981).
35

In re Estate of Meyer, 2016 WY 6, ¶¶ 26–27, 367 P.3d 629, 637–68 (Wyo. 2016) (citing
Averill, The Wyoming Probate Code of 1980, supra note 35, at 108, 127).
36

37

See Averill, The Wyoming Probate Code of 1980, supra note 35, at 106.

Id. The problems asserted were voluminous in number and covered a broad range of issues.
Id. at 106–09. See also In re Estate of Meyer, ¶ 26, 367 P.3d at 637; S.F. 14, 45th Leg., Budget Sess.
(Wyo. 1980) (providing a review of those provisions the legislature sought to remedy).
38

39

In re Estate of Meyer, ¶ 26, 367 P.3d at 637.

40

Averill, The Wyoming Probate Code of 1980, supra note 35, at 105.

Probate Code, 1980 Wyo. Sess. Laws 54 (codified as amended at WYO. STAT. ANN.
§§ 2-1-101 to 2-15-106 (2017)). Because the changes swept across the entirety of the probate
code, “[n]o detailed explanation of the changes made by the 1980 act has been attempted” by the
legislature. WYO. STAT. ANN. tit. 2 note (2017).
41

See, e.g., Averill, The Wyoming Probate Code of 1980, supra note 35, at 178 (“The new
Code’s procedure [for a larger estate] is still based primarily upon continuous court involvement
and supervision throughout the proceedings . . . . Consequently, the time, effort, and expense of
administration will continue to be at approximately the same level as existed under prior law.”).
42

43
See In re Estate of Meyer, 2016 WY 6, 367 P.3d 629 (addressing ambiguity within the
Code); Stevens, supra note 27, at 295; Averill, The Wyoming Probate Code of 1980, supra note 35, at
105–09 (addressing technical issues with the Code).
44

Stevens, supra note 27, at 295.
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to properly distribute an estate’s assets.45 Under modern law, many options
exist for tailoring this process to the nature and needs of an individual estate,
such as petitioning for shortened proceedings with reduced formalities when
administering a small or relatively noncomplex estate.46 Executors and personal
representatives must, therefore, take care to ensure they have selected the most
advantageous procedure and, more importantly, that the procedure chosen will
make a complete distribution of the estate’s assets.47 In some circumstances, an
executor or personal representative will be required to initiate additional probate
proceedings beyond those held in the decedent’s domiciliary state to accomplish
this objective.48 Such is frequently the case when a decedent domiciled in one
state dies owning real property within another state.49 When this occurs, a “situs
approach” is applied to dispose of that real property.50 Under situs principles, the
probate court in the state where the real property is located has sole jurisdiction
to dispose of the real property.51 This differs from a decedent’s personal property,
which is distributed under the jurisdiction of the state in which the decedent was
domiciled at death.52
Therefore, unless a state’s statutory provisions provide otherwise, situs laws
dictate that a will probated in the court of one jurisdiction will not effectively
convey title to real property situated in another state’s jurisdiction.53 To convey
title to real property in these circumstances, the jurisdiction where the real
property is located must hold its own probate proceedings, separate from that
of the domiciliary state.54 This secondary proceeding is commonly known as the
“ancillary” probate proceeding, used in this context to denote a “supplementary”
rather than “subordinate” procedure.55 In addition to facilitating the property’s
conveyance, this proceeding also serves to ensure title is properly recorded in the
45

See THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 4, § 88.13(a).

Id. For example, Wyoming has enacted summary distribution proceedings as an alternative
to full probate proceedings for qualifying estates. See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-1-205.
46

47

See 34 C.J.S. Executors and Administrators § 212 (2018).

George A. Wilson, Ancillary Administration, in 2 ESTATE TAX & PERSONAL FINANCE
PLANNING § 20:24 (Edward F. Koren ed., 2017).
48

49
3 JEFFREY A. SCHOENBLUM, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 26.15 (Matthew Bender ed., 2d
ed. 2017).
50

16 AM. JUR. 2D Conflict of Laws § 22 (2018).

51

DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 158.

52

Id.

53

79 AM. JUR. 2D Wills § 713 (2018).

54

Id.

DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 44; Ancillary, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th
Pocket ed. 2016); In re Estate of Reed, 768 P.2d 566, 569 n.3 (Wyo. 1989) (“The term ‘ancillary
administration’ does not connote a subordinate or inferiority to the domiciliary administration.
Ancillary administration is simply the probate that occurs where a decedent had property but was
not domiciled at the time of his death.”).
55
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situs state and local creditors are afforded an opportunity to discharge a decedent’s
debts.56 Because full probate proceedings have likely already occurred in the
domiciliary state, many courts will not “hear witnesses or pass upon the merits”
of a will’s validity during ancillary probate.57 Rather, they admit a testator’s will to
probate based upon a record of the domiciliary court previously doing so.58
There has been debate among scholars as to the merits of the situs approach
for disposal of real property.59 It is frequently criticized for imposing additional
expenditures through the requirement of a secondary proceeding.60 Added costs
often include local court fees, commission to a local personal representative, and
attorney’s fees.61 Additionally, probate courts applying situs rules are often tasked
with untangling difficult conflict of laws questions.62 For these reasons, the situs
approach became a topic of global discussion during the Hague Convention of
1989.63 Several changes to the current principles on transfers of wealth upon
death were suggested, including the elimination of the law of situs applicable
to real property.64 Following the Convention, many countries were persuaded
to abandon the situs approach.65 The United States took the opposite stance,
however, and instead strongly advocated for retention of situs laws based on
economic, political, social, and conflict resolution considerations.66 The United
States has not deviated from this viewpoint since the 1989 Convention, and today
the situs approach is applied in all fifty states.67

56

DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, 44.

57

SCHOENBLUM, supra note 49, § 26.13.

58

Id.

Jeffrey Schoenblum, Choice of Law and Succession to Wealth: A Critical Analysis of the
Ramifications of the Hague Convention on Succession to Decedents’ Estates, 32 VA. J. INT’L L. 83,
88 – 89 (1991) [hereinafter Choice of Law and Succession to Wealth].
59

60

DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 44.

61

Id.

62
16 AM. JUR. 2D Conflict of Laws § 22 (2018). Wyoming courts commonly resolve this
issue through the application of lex loci rei sitae, meaning “the law of the place where property is
located controls.” In re Estate of Reed, 768 P.2d 566, 569 –70 (Wyo. 1989); see also WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 2-6-104 (2017).

Schoenblum, Choice of Law and Succession to Wealth, supra note 59, at 88–89. The Hague
Convention was assembled for the purpose of changing the choice of law rules applicable to the
succession of decedents’ estates. Id. at 84–86.
63

64

Id. at 86.

65

Id. at 88– 89.

Id. For example, the United States argued retention was necessary to preserve title reporting
systems and reduce restraints on alienation. Id. at 89 n.27. Other nations (including Australia,
Canada, and France) joined the United States’ show of support for retention of the situs approach.
Id. at 87.
66

67

16 AM. JUR. 2D Conflict of Laws § 22.
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Situs principles are firmly established in Wyoming and, indeed, Wyoming
courts have acknowledged their advantage when applied to land transactions.68
Because the validity of a nonresident testator’s will and distribution of a nonresident
testator’s real property located in Wyoming are governed solely by the laws of
this state, the Wyoming Probate Code offers nonresidents two primary statutory
processes for ancillary administration.69 The first is under Wyoming Statute
§ 2-11-104.70 It reads:
If upon presentation it appears to the satisfaction of the court
that the will has been duly proved, allowed and admitted to
probate outside of this state and that it was executed according
to the law of the place in which the same was made, or in which
the testator was at the time domiciled, or in conformity with
the laws of this state, it shall be admitted to probate, which
probate has the same force and effect as the original probate of
a domestic will.71
This statute is a mechanism for admitting foreign wills to probate.72 It can cure
defects in compliance with will execution formalities that could arise when a
foreign will is executed in another state with different formality requirements
than those set forth in Chapter six of the Wyoming Probate Code.73 However,
the statute has no effect upon the administration of the will once it is admitted to
probate—a full probate proceeding still takes place.74
The second statute is Wyoming Statute § 2-11-201.75 Under this statute, a
nonresident estate can probate Wyoming property valued at less than $200,000 if
the estate has been duly settled in the domiciliary state.76 The petitioning executor
must file certain documents with the Wyoming court, including: “a petition under
oath showing the facts in the case together with certified copies of the petition,

In re Estate of Reed, 768 P.2d 566, 570 (Wyo. 1989) (citations omitted) (“[I]t is
particularly important that there be certainty, predictability and uniformity of result and ease in the
determination and application of the law to be applied concerning transactions of land.”).
68

69

WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 2-11-104, -201 (2017).

70

Id. § 2-11-104.

71

Id.

72

Id.

73

Id.

Lawrence H. Averill, Jr., Wyoming’s Law of Decedents’ Estates, Guardianship and Trusts:
A Comparison with the Uniform Probate Code—Part III, IX LAND & WATER L. REV. 567, 568–
569 (1974).
74

75

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-11-201.

76

Id.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol18/iss2/8
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order of appointment of executor or administrator, inventory and final decree
of distribution of estate therein, and a full showing that debts of the estate have
been paid.”77 The district court must then provide three weeks’ notice by
publication, including a statement that the petitioner intends to admit the
foreign proceedings as the probate of the estate in Wyoming.78 This publication
serves as notice to interested local creditors or heirs and is often fulfilled by an
announcement within a local newspaper.79 After publication, the district court
holds a hearing on the petition and, in the absence of any objections, the Wyoming
property will be disposed of.80
Thus, § 2-11-201 places two restrictions on use by a nonresident.81 First,
the property must be valued at $200,000 or less.82 Second, the estate must be
duly settled in the domiciliary jurisdiction.83 Therefore, this procedure cannot be
used by nonresidents whose properties have high net values or who would like to
administer the Wyoming property before the primary probate proceedings have
been completed.84 Nonresident estates falling outside of these qualifications must
use § 2-11-104, wherein full administration proceedings will take place.85 The
processes laid forth in these two statutory provisions have remained substantively
unchanged since their original enactment, aside from periodical increases to
the monetary limit under § 2-11-201.86 The present value, $200,000, became
effective on March 13, 2013.87

77

Id.

78

Id.; see also Averill, The Wyoming Probate Code of 1980, supra note 35, at 175.

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-7-201; see generally In re Estate of Reed, 768 P.2d 566 (Wyo.
1989) (examining the sufficiency of notice under Wyoming Statute § 2-7-201 by publication in a
local newspaper).
79

80
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-11-201. If an objection is raised at the hearing by a creditor whose
claims were not addressed in the domiciliary state, the court will postpone the matter, and the
creditor may petition for letters of administration to be issued. Id.
81

Id.

82

Id.

83

Id.

84

Averill, The Wyoming Probate Code of 1980, supra note 35, at 175.

85

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-11-104.

Sections 2-11-201 and 2-11-104 were originally enacted in 1913 and 1921, respectively.
WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 2-11-201, -104.
86

87
Id. § 2-11-201. At the time the executor in the principal case undertook Wyoming ancillary
proceedings, the monetary limitation was set much lower, at $30,000. Id.; Lon V. Smith Found. v.
Devon Energy Corp., 2017 WY 121, ¶ 26 n.7, 403 P.3d 997, 1005 n.7 (Wyo. 2017) (“The value
of Mr. Smith’s Wyoming property did not exceed that limit when he died, presumably because no
wells had been drilled on the lease at that time.”).
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III. PRINCIPAL CASE
A. Facts
This case considers the distribution of Lon V. Smith’s estate.88 Though Mr.
Smith was a resident of California, in 1973, he obtained a Federal Bureau of Land
Management (BLM) oil and gas lease located in Carbon County, Wyoming.89
One year later, Mr. Smith assigned this lease to another entity, but retained a 5%
overriding royalty interest (ORRI).90 In 1979, Mr. Smith died with a valid will
that provided for all of his oil and gas interests, including the above described
Wyoming ORRI, to be distributed to his wife as a life estate, and then, upon her
death, to be distributed to the Lon V. Smith Foundation (the Foundation).91 Mr.
Smith’s will also contained a residuary clause, which devised the remainder of his
estate to his wife in fee simple.92
Upon his death, Mr. Smith’s will was admitted to probate in California
and, in 1983, a California court entered its final order upon probate.93 This
final decree included several pages describing the oil and gas interests owned
by Mr. Smith and ordered them to be transferred to Mrs. Smith as a life estate
upon Mr. Smith’s death, and then, upon Mrs. Smith’s death, to be distributed
to the Foundation.94 However, the California probate order only referenced
California property, and consequently did not explicitly transfer the Wyoming
ORRI within its listed description of oil and gas interests to be distributed to
Mrs. Smith as a life estate.95 Neither party disputed that this probate order
did not distribute the Wyoming ORRI in accordance with Mr. Smith’s will,

88

Lon V. Smith Found., 2017 WY 121, 403 P.3d 997.

89

Id. ¶ 7, 403 P.3d at 1001.

Id. An ORRI is “a share of production, free of the costs of production, carved out of the
lessee’s interest under an oil and gas lease.” WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-304 (2017).
90

91

Lon V. Smith Found., ¶¶ 7– 8, 403 P.3d at 1001.

Brief of Appellant at 62, Lon V. Smith Found. v. Devon Energy Corp., 2017 WY 121
(Wyo. 2017) (No. S-17-0021), 2017 WL 2655266, at *62.
92

93

Lon V. Smith Found., ¶¶ 7– 8, 403 P.3d at 1001.

94

Id.

Id. Failure to list the Wyoming ORRI within the final order was, as noted by the district
court, “not necessarily an issue because the California probate court likely lacked jurisdiction to
distribute an interest in real property located in Wyoming. Indeed, interests in real property located
outside California are ‘traditionally handled through ancillary probate administrations in the foreign
jurisdictions.’” Order on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment and Other Pending Motions at 3,
Lon V. Smith Found. v. Devon Energy Corp., 2017 WY 121 (Wyo. 2017) (No. CV-2015-0088),
2016 WL 8715849, at *3. The California decree specifically stated: “all of the known assets of said
Estate, subject to distribution, including mineral interests, oil and gas leases and royalties remaining
for distribution in the State of California are set forth and described in the following order.” Brief
of Appellant at 13, Lon V. Smith Found. v. Devon Energy Corp., 2017 WY 121 (Wyo. 2017) (No.
S-17-0021), 2017 WL 2655266, at *13 (emphasis added).
95
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which provided the ORRI would be transferred to his wife as a life estate with
the remainder interest to the Foundation, along with all of his other oil and
gas interests.96
In 1985, two years after the entry of the California probate order, an ancillary
probate proceeding was opened pursuant to Wyoming Statute § 2-11-201 in
Natrona County, Wyoming to distribute Mr. Smith’s Wyoming real property.97
Upon the completion of § 2-11-201 requirements, the Natrona County District
Court entered its final ancillary probate order.98 This order was then recorded
in Carbon County, Wyoming, where the ORRI was located.99 The Wyoming
probate order, issued under § 2-11-201, was wholly based upon the California
probate order, thus, the Wyoming probate order also omitted any reference to the
Wyoming ORRI.100 In 1987, the attorney who handled the Wyoming probate
proceedings executed corrective affidavits, which were recorded alongside the
original probate order in Carbon County.101 These affidavits acknowledged the
probate order’s failure to address the Wyoming property and provided copies of
Mr. Smith’s will, which the affidavits asserted should control the disposition of the
Wyoming property.102
At the end of 1989, Mrs. Smith also passed away, and the bulk of her estate
flowed into a pour over testamentary trust (the Trust).103 In the years following
96

Lon V. Smith Found., ¶ 9, 403 P.3d at 1001.

Id. ¶ 10, 403 P.3d at 1001. Although states differ on this issue, Wyoming treats an ORRI
as real, rather than personal, property. Dame v. Mileski, 340 P.2d 205, 209 (Wyo. 1959); see also
Martin J. McMahon, Annotation, Oil and Gas Royalty as Real or Personal Property, 56 A.L.R. 4th
539, 2a (1987). Consequently, Mr. Smith’s ownership of an ORRI located in Wyoming triggered
the law of situs for real property at his death and, therefore, the need for ancillary administration
proceedings in this case. See supra notes 48–54 and accompanying text.
97

98

Lon V. Smith Found., ¶ 10, 403 P.3d at 1001.

Brief of Defendant-Appellee Andrew Klein, as Trustee of the Marguerite-Brown Smith
Trust at 4–5, Lon V. Smith Found. v. Devon Energy Corp., 2017 WY 121 (Wyo. 2017) (No.
S-17-0021), 2017 WL 2655267, at *4–5.
99

100

Lon V. Smith Found., ¶ 10, 403 P.3d at 1001.

101

Brief of Defendant-Appellee, supra note 99, at 18, *18.

102

Id.

Id. at *5. Interestingly, the same issue that occurred when the ORRI was distributed during
Wyoming ancillary proceedings upon Mr. Smith’s death, namely, omission of the ORRI from
the Wyoming probate order, reoccurred when it was again distributed during Wyoming ancillary
proceedings upon Mrs. Smith’s death. Id. In 2005, Devon requested documentation demonstrating
a conveyance of the ORRI from Mrs. Smith, individually, to the Trust. Id. A trustee notified Devon
that “the ORRI had been inadvertently omitted from the Wyoming ancillary probate proceedings
for Mrs. Smith’s estate and he was taking the steps to reopen the probate action to add the
Carbon County mineral interests to her estate.” Id. at *8. Thereafter, “Mrs. Smith’s probate estate
was reopened in 2005, and the Carbon County mineral interests were added as after-discovered
property, and the interests were transferred in accordance with Mrs. Smith’s will. The probate court
entered an order permitting the Estate of Mrs. Smith be reopened and the ORRI be transferred to
Mr. Joseph Kean, as Trustee of the Trust.” Id.
103
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Mrs. Smith’s death, the lessees of the Wyoming ORRI, Devon Energy
Corporation and Devon Energy Production Company L.P. (collectively, Devon),
made payments at different times with respect to different wells under the ORRI
to both the Foundation and the Trust.104 Devon remained the lessee from 1982
until 2014, at which time it sold its interest to Linn Operating, Inc.105 Shortly
after selling its interest, Devon sent a letter to the Trust stating its belief that the
Foundation, not the Trust, “was entitled to royalty payments on certain wells.”106
The letter thus requested the Trust repay the sum of money it had received from
Devon for the ORRI so that Devon could credit the money to the Foundation.107
The Trust refused to repay the royalty payments to Devon, and the Foundation subsequently brought suit against Devon, its successor Linn Operating, Inc.,
and the Trust.108 The Foundation claimed that, under the terms of Mr. Smith’s
will, it was entitled to the ORRI payments.109 In response, Devon brought a
counterclaim “seeking declaratory judgment on the ownership of the ORRI”, and
a cross-claim “seeking indemnification [from] the Trust.”110 Thereafter, each party
filed a motion for summary judgment.111 The district court granted summary
judgment for Devon and held that the ORRI passed to the Trust; therefore, the
Foundation was not entitled to any royalty payments.112 The parties each filed
several appeals, which the Wyoming Supreme Court consolidated for review.113

B. The Court’s Analysis and Holding
On appeal, the appellants raised three primary issues.114 However, this case
note will only focus on the Wyoming Supreme Court’s holding and analysis as
to whether the “district court correctly determine[d] as a matter of law that
the 1983 California probate order and the 1985 Wyoming ancillary probate

104

Lon V. Smith Found., ¶ 11, 403 P.3d at 1002.

105

Id. ¶ 6, 403 P.3d at 1001.

Id. ¶ 11, 403 P.3d at 1002. The ORRI covered a total of eleven wells, the first of which
was completed in 1982. Order on Cross Motions, supra note 95, at 2, *2. However, only royalty
payments made on four of these wells were at issue in this case. Id. Those wells were completed in
the years 2000, 2004, and 2007. Id.
106

107

Lon V. Smith Found., ¶ 11, 403 P.3d at 1002.

108

Id.

109

Id.

110

Id. ¶ 12, 403 P.3d at 1002.

111

Id. ¶ 13, 403 P.3d at 1002.

112

Id. ¶¶ 130–14, 403 P.3d at 1002.

113

Id. ¶ 14, 403 P.3d at 1002.

114

Id. ¶ 3, 403 P.3d at 1000.
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order govern, and that the Trust is the owner of the ORRI at issue.”115 Because
this appeal arose from a grant of summary judgment, the court’s analysis was
conducted under a de novo standard of review.116
The court’s holding as to this issue was threefold. First, the court held the
California probate decree governed distribution of the Wyoming ORRI, not the
will.117 In reaching this conclusion, the court addressed several arguments by the
Foundation to the contrary.118 The first argument asserted that both Wyoming
and California laws require an examination of the testator’s intent which, in
this case, was expressed in Mr. Smith’s will and not the probate orders.119 The
court acknowledged testamentary intent as a policy consideration within probate
proceedings, but maintained that “the time for evaluating the intent of the
testator is during probate.”120 Accordingly, the court found that, because Mr.
Smith’s testamentary intent was considered during the 1983 California probate
proceedings, such a consideration need not have been repeated during Wyoming’s
ancillary administration, wherein the court merely adopted California’s
proceedings pursuant to Wyoming Statute § 2-11-201.121 The court noted full
probate proceedings could have taken place under Wyoming Statute § 2-11-104,
during which testamentary intent could have been re-examined, but the executor
of Mr. Smith’s estate instead opted for truncated proceedings under Wyoming
Statute § 2-11-201.122
The court went on to hold that, after chosen probate proceedings have taken
place and a probate decree is subsequently entered, that decree “supersedes the
will and controls the [property] distribution.”123 If a mistake is found within the
decree, the court maintained that the appropriate remedy is an appeal, and, absent
such an action, the decree remains a final judgment.124 Though the Foundation
argued based upon the Wyoming Supreme Court’s holding in In re Estate of

Id. The two additional issues addressed by the court were: (1) whether the “district court
properly dismiss[ed] the Foundation’s claim that Devon violated Wyoming Statute § 30-5-302
(2017) when it is undisputed that Devon held ORRI proceeds in Devon’s own ‘suspense account’
and not in an interest-bearing account in a Wyoming financial institution” and (2) whether “either
party [is] entitled to attorney fees under the WRPA.” Id.
115

Id. ¶ 16, 403 P.3d at 1003 (“We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, using the
same materials and following the same standards as the district court.”).
116

117

Id. ¶ 23, 403 P.3d at 1004.

118

Id. ¶¶ 18–31, 403 P.3d at 1003–07.

119

Id. ¶ 19, 403 P.3d at 1003.

120

Id.

121

Id.

122

Id.

123

Id. ¶ 20, 403 P.3d at 1003.

124

Id. ¶ 23, 403 P.3d at 1004.
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Kimball that the probate order must be construed in accordance with the terms
of the will, the court found the referenced statement to be dicta and held that
incorporation does not automatically occur whenever a decree references a will.125
Therefore, after emphasizing the significance of probate order finality, the court
found the appellants’ action to be an improper collateral attack on the decree.126
The court next responded to the Foundation’s assertion that, when an
estate is dispensed with under Wyoming Statute § 2-11-201, courts should look
beyond the foreign decree and also examine the decedent’s will.127 The court
rejected this argument on the ground that relevant case law “does not stand for the
proposition that when a will and decree are admitted in an ancillary proceeding,
the court must look to the will to determine how property passes.”128 The
Foundation also argued that under the language of the Wyoming order, the
district court did not adopt the California order’s distribution of property; it
merely adopted “conclusive evidence of the facts” which were established during
the California proceeding.129 The court held interpreting the statute in this
manner would be in contravention of its purpose, which is to make a distribution
of property upon the filing of a foreign probate decree.130 The Wyoming Supreme
Court additionally invoked statutory interpretation principles to hold that,
because it is the foreign decree which is named by statute, not the testator’s
will, “when the district court ‘admitted’ the California proceedings as ‘original
proceedings’ of the court, the California probate order became an order of the
Wyoming court,” and the will did not.131 The Foundation lastly argued the
California court did not have jurisdiction over the Wyoming property; therefore,
the California order could not distribute the Wyoming property.132 The court
acknowledged California’s lack of jurisdiction but found that the California
decree was incorporated into the Wyoming decree, which did have proper
jurisdiction to dispose of the property.133
Second, the court held the Wyoming ORRI must be distributed as residue
under the language of the California decree.134 The court found the ORRI was
125
Id. ¶ 21, 403 P.3d at 1004. The Kimball court placed heavy emphasis on the factual
circumstances compelling its decision to allow incorporation of the testator’s will in that particular
case; namely, that it was correcting a clerical, rather than judicial, error. Id.; In re Estate of Kimball,
583 P.2d 1274, 1278 (Wyo. 1978).
126

Lon V. Smith Found., ¶ 23, 403 P.3d at 1004.

127

See id. ¶¶ 24–28, 403 P.3d at 1005– 06.

128

Id. ¶ 28, 403 P.3d at 1006 (citing Hawks v. Creswell, 144 P.2d 129 (Wyo. 1943)).

129

Id. ¶ 29, 403 P.3d at 1006.

130

Id.

131

Id. ¶¶ 29–30, 403 P.3d at 1006–07.

132

Id. ¶ 31, 403 P.3d at 1007.

133

Id.

134

Id. ¶ 32, 403 P.3d at 1007.
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not explicitly listed with the other mineral interests, oil and gas leases, and
properties, either to be distributed to Mrs. Smith as a life estate or to the
Foundation as a remainder interest.135 Therefore, the court held ownership was
transferred to Mrs. Smith in fee simple under the effect of the decree’s residuary
clause—a provision designed to distribute any property not clearly bequeathed
by the testator.136 However, the California probate order also included a
provision addressing “other and after-discovered property,” which was to be
distributed “in accordance with decedent’s said Last Will to the said Marguerite
B. Smith.”137 The Foundation argued the ORRI constituted “other and afterdiscovered property,” and therefore should have fallen within this provision and
been distributed in accordance with the will.138 The court declined to make this
categorization because the ORRI was indisputably a known interest; it simply
was not subject to any distribution within the order.139 Additionally, the court
stated even if it were to assume arguendo that the ORRI was “other and afterdiscovered property,” under the language of the order, it would have nonetheless
been distributed to Mrs. Smith in fee simple.140 The court then employed tools of
contract construction and looked to the definition of “after-discovered property”
to rebut the Foundation’s contention that interpreting the decree in this manner
would render the catch-all provision in Mr. Smith’s will meaningless.141 It found
the catch-all provision was included solely to distribute any after-discovered
property, which did not include the ORRI because it was a known asset at the
time proceedings took place.142
Finally, the court held the corrective affidavits attached to the Wyoming
probate decree had no effect on title to the property—despite purporting to
modify the decree’s terms.143 Although Wyoming Statute § 2-2-301 requires any
“judgment or decree entered by a probate court affecting title to real property . . .
to ‘be recorded in the county in which the property is situated,’” the court held the
language of § 2-2-301 has no simultaneous requirement that the will be recorded
alongside the decree.144 Therefore, parties conducting a title search would discover
the probate court’s decree but not the conflicting will.145 The Foundation refuted

135

Id.

136

See id.

137

Id. ¶ 33, 403 P.3d at 1007– 08.

138

Id.

139

Id. ¶¶ 33–34, 403 P.3d at 1007– 08.

140

Id.

141

Id. ¶ 35, 403 P.3d at 1008.

142

Id.; see supra note 188 and accompanying text.

143

Lon V. Smith Found., ¶ 37, 403 P.3d at 1008.

144

Id.

145

Id.
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this point by arguing the will, in this case, was attached to the public land records
and, therefore, was available to any party conducting a title search.146 The court
found this factual distinction insignificant.147 Lastly, the court noted Wyoming
Statute § 34-11-101(b) sets forth the subjects upon which affidavits affecting
title may be filed, and in the absence of a provision for modification of a probate
decree, it is an ineffective means of altering title or the probate decree.148

IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Court’s Holding was Correct
Although it produced an outcome that was contrary to the testator’s intent,
the Wyoming Supreme Court was correct when it held that the Natrona County
District Court properly adopted California court proceedings as the basis of its
own decree, which then governed distribution of Mr. Smith’s estate. Such a
result was explicitly authorized under the plain language of Wyoming Statute
§ 2-11-201.149 The statute directs a Wyoming judge not to conduct his own
proceedings but, rather, to issue an order “admitting . . . certified copies of the
[foreign jurisdiction’s] proceedings in the estate to record in his court . . . [to] be
considered and treated from that time as original proceedings in his court.”150
This is done so that, upon proper receipt of the foreign proceedings, “the probate
of the estate in this state may be dispensed with.”151 When, such as here, the
term “dispense” is used as an intransitive verb to form the phrase “dispense
with,” it is defined to mean “to set aside,” “discard,” or “to do without.”152 This
language clearly prescribes Wyoming courts should “discard” or “do without” any
probate proceedings of their own. Indeed, the district courts would be unable
to adequately hold any such proceeding because none of the requisite filings
enumerated in the statute include the testator’s will.153 The Wyoming Supreme
Court aptly described the practical reason behind this omission when it stated
that “a proceeding under this section does not require the filing of the will
because . . . [it] provides a method by which probate in a different state substitutes
for the procedure in Wyoming.”154

146

Id. ¶ 38, 403 P.3d at 1008– 09.

147

Id.

148

Id. ¶ 39, 403 P.3d at 1009.

149

See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-11-201 (2017).

150

Id.

151

Id.

152

Dispense, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2016).

153

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-11-201.

Lon V. Smith Found. v. Devon Energy Corp., 2017 WY 121, ¶ 26, 403 P.3d 997, 1005
(Wyo. 2017) (emphasis added).
154
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Thus, § 2-11-201 effectively operates as the Wyoming legislature’s refusal
to empower its courts to exercise full jurisdiction over the disposition of real
property owned by nonresidents within the state.155 Undoubtedly, Wyoming has
inherent jurisdiction to make final and conclusive determinations surrounding the
disposition of real property within its borders, such as passing upon the validity
of a will, determining how the will’s provisions should be construed, directing the
distribution of estate assets, and settling claims by creditors—even if a foreign
jurisdiction rendered a different decision on these matters.156 However, rather
than pass on these issues, the language of § 2-11-201 alternatively directs the
district courts to cede to the foreign jurisdiction’s designations.157 This concession
of jurisdictional power under § 2-11-201 relieved the district court in the
principal case of any obligation to examine testamentary intent or query whether
the foreign proceedings were in accordance with Wyoming law.158 Consequently,
when the executor petitioned for ancillary proceedings under § 2-11-201 and
filed the requisite documentation, the foreign proceedings were incorporated
into the Wyoming court’s own final decree of distribution in their entirety, with
no additional findings, interpretation, or distribution made by the Wyoming
district court.159 A final probate decree of this nature would typically be created
by interpreting and carrying out the testator’s intent as depicted in his will.160
However, this statute effectively eliminates that judicial process for all ancillary
administration proceedings held pursuant to this provision.161
Therefore, the Natrona County District Court properly entered the Wyoming
decree as a final judgment, without reviewing the decree’s underlying factual

155

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-11-201.

156

SCHOENBLUM, supra note 49, § 26.15; In re Estate of Reed, 768 P.2d 566, 570 (Wyo. 1989).

157

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-11-201.

158

Id.

See Lon V. Smith Found., ¶ 27, 403 P.3d at 1006. In addition to filing the appropriate
documentation, the estate also met all of the other statutory prerequisites listed in § 2-11-201. Id.
The estate was valued at less than $30,000 and had been duly probated and settled in California,
evidenced by the entry of a final probate decree by the California court. Id. ¶¶ 26 n.7, 27, 403
P.3d at 1005 n.7, 1006. The district court further acknowledged that “a hearing was set and held,
publication of the notice was made, that no creditor or other interested person had appeared to
object to the proceedings . . . .” Id. ¶ 27, 403 P.3d at 1006; see also WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-11-201.
The Wyoming decree within the principal case read: “[t]he certified copies of the proceedings in the
Matter of the Estate of Lon V. Smith, in the Superior Court of the State of California . . . be and
they are hereby admitted to this Court and to be considered and treated as original proceedings of
this Court and as conclusive evidence of the facts therein shown.” Lon V. Smith Found., ¶ 27, 403
P.3d at 1006.
159

160

34 C.J.S. Executors and Administrators § 687 (2018).

161

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-11-201.
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basis.162 Once entered, this decree superseded Mr. Smith’s will and irrefutably
governed the effect of any bequests thereunder.163 The Wyoming property involved
was then “discharged from any further administration” and ceased to be a part of
Mr. Smith’s estate.164 At that point, the probate court was “without control or
jurisdiction to make any [further] order affecting it, except . . . as . . . necessary
to compel compliance.”165 As a result, it was the decree that ultimately stood as
the governing document over title to the estate’s assets, despite Mr. Smith’s
conflicting will.
Thereafter, the court correctly interpreted the decree’s terms to mean
ownership of the Wyoming ORRI passed to the Trust under the residuary devise
as part of the “rest, residue and remainder” of Mr. Smith’s estate.166 Generally, a
residuary clause disposes of any estate property not otherwise disposed of by a
specific or general devise within the will.167 The purpose behind these “catch-all”
provisions is to avoid the testator’s property passing through intestacy by making
a “complete testamentary disposition” of the estate.168 Under the language of Mr.
Smith’s will, the Wyoming ORRI would not have fallen within the residuary
devise because, as a matter of fact, it was already specifically devised.169 This devise
unequivocally stated the ORRI was to pass to Mrs. Smith as a life estate and,
upon her death, to the Foundation as a remainder.170 Such language created a
clear manifestation of testamentary intent for the property to be excluded from
the residuary clause.171 However, based upon the final decree’s operation as a final
judgment, the Wyoming Supreme Court was required to look to the decree for
a determination of the ORRI’s ownership.172 The decree made no reference to
the Wyoming property, but did include the testator’s residuary clause, which
devised the remainder of his estate to his wife, Mrs. Smith, in fee simple.173 In the

See In re Estate of Novakovich, 2004 WY 158, ¶ 19, 101 P.3d 931, 936 (Wyo. 2004); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 2-2-101; 34 C.J.S. Executors and Administrators § 687 (“Where a decree of distribution
is made after due notice, by a court having jurisdiction, and it has not been set aside or modified
in a proper and timely proceeding or reversed or modified on appeal, and no appeal therefrom is
pending, the decree is final, conclusive, and res judicata.”).
162

163
34 C.J.S. Executors and Administrators § 687; Lon V. Smith Found., ¶ 20, 403 P.3d at 1003
(“When a decree is issued, it supersedes the will and controls the distribution.”).
164

34 C.J.S. Executors and Administrators § 687.

165

Id.

166

Lon V. Smith Found., ¶ 34, 403 P.3d at 1008.

167

96 C.J.S. Wills § 1322 (2018).

168

Id.

169

Id.; see also Lon V. Smith Found., ¶ 34, 403 P.3d at 1008.

170

See supra note 91 and accompanying text.

171

96 C.J.S. Wills § 1322.

172

See 96 C.J.S. Wills § 1322; supra notes 123–24 and accompanying text.

173

See supra notes 92, 135–36 and accompanying text.
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absence of a specific devise of the ORRI within the decree, the court necessarily
determined the ORRI fell within the residuary devise so as to give a complete
disposition of all known assets.174 The Wyoming ORRI thus passed to Mrs. Smith
in fee simple under the residuary devise of Mr. Smith’s will and, upon her death,
ceded to the Trust in accordance with her pour-over will.175
Finally, after Wyoming ancillary proceedings were closed, the court was
correct to hold that appellants’ delayed attack on the district court’s decree, nearly
thirty years later, was improper.176 The district court gave constructive notice in
the form of publication at the time the proceedings were to be admitted in
Wyoming, affording the Foundation opportunity to raise its objections.177 In the
absence of any such objections, once the district court entered the final probate
decree, the Foundation had thirty days to file an appeal.178 Two appealable orders
are entered at the conclusion of probate proceedings.179 One is the final decree
of distribution, which identifies the beneficiaries to whom the estate is to be
distributed and the portion they will receive.180 The other is an order closing the
pending estate, entered when the court is satisfied that the personal representative
has completed his or her duties and none of the estate’s known assets remain
for administration or distribution.181 Here, the Foundation’s recourse in Wyoming
for the incorrect distribution would have been to appeal the final decree
of distribution.182
The Wyoming probate code only permits an estate to be reopened without
an appeal in three circumstances.183 The first is for the purpose of “administering
after-discovered property or for the correction of the description of any property
that was administered during the original probate.”184 The second requires

174

96 C.J.S. Wills § 1322; see supra notes 135–36 and accompanying text.

175

See supra notes 135–36 and accompanying text.

176

See supra notes 123–26 and accompanying text.

177

See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-11-201 (2017); supra note 159 and accompanying text.

Wyoming Statute § 2-2-308 applies the provisions of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure
to state probate courts, including those governing appeals. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-2-308; Wyo. R.
App. P. 2.01(a).
178

179

Estate of Dahlke ex rel. Jubie v. Dahlke, 2014 WY 29, ¶ 41, 319 P.3d 116, 126 (Wyo. 2014).

180

Id.; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-7-813.

181

Estate of Dahlke, ¶ 40, 319 P.3d at 126; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-7-815.

See Lon V. Smith Found. v. Devon Energy Corp., 2017 WY 121, ¶ 23, 403 P.3d 997, 1004
(Wyo. 2017).
182

In re Estate of Novakovich, 2004 WY 158, ¶ 12, 101 P.3d 931, 937 (Wyo. 2004)
(identifying two of the three circumstances); In re Estate of Kimball, 583 P.2d 1274, 1278 (Wyo.
1978) (identifying the third circumstance).
183

In re Estate of Novakovich, ¶ 12, 101 P.3d at 937; see also WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-8-101; In re
Estate of Kimball, 583 P.2d at 1277–78.
184

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2018

19

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 18 [2018], No. 2, Art. 8

398

WYOMING LAW REVIEW

Vol. 18

a showing that creditor claims were not timely filed and would otherwise be
barred.185 The third is an accusation of fraud in the will’s execution.186 Outside of
these narrow circumstances, both orders stand as final judgments and settle title to
the estate’s assets.187 As the Wyoming Supreme Court noted, the Wyoming ORRI
in the principal case did not constitute after-discovered property because it was a
known asset at the time of the Wyoming proceedings; indeed, knowledge of the
ORRI’s presence was the purpose behind petitioning for the ancillary proceedings
in the first place.188 Accordingly, in the absence of an appeal, the Foundation was
without recourse in Wyoming for the improper estate distribution.

B. Competing Interests Implicated by this Holding
Generally, probate proceedings serve to fulfill three primary functions: to
facilitate and furnish record of the transfer of title, to provide a process through
which creditors may secure payment of the decedent’s debts, and to distribute
the decedent’s property to the intended beneficiaries.189 Various additional state
interests are often taken into consideration when state legislative bodies enact
the procedures through which these functions are to be achieved.190 Perhaps the
primary state interest in this context is one of efficiency—born from the sharp
criticisms of modern probate law as being “slow, cumbersome, and expensive.”191
Indeed, Wyoming Statute § 2-1-102 attempts to specifically address such pitfalls
by asserting the probate code should be “construed and applied, to promote
the . . . speedy and efficient system for liquidating the estate of the decedent and
making distribution to his successors” whenever possible.192
The realm of ancillary administration is one area within probate law that
is especially susceptible to such criticisms in light of its added cost and time
impositions on nonresident estates.193 In recognition of these concerns, Wyoming
state legislators sought to afford a process to nonresidents that would enable the
simplified and relatively inexpensive probate of their Wyoming real property, a
goal that was ultimately effectuated through the enactment of Wyoming Statute

In re Estate of Novakovich, ¶ 12, 101 P.3d at 937; see also WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-7-703; In re
Estate of Kimball, 583 P.2d at 1277–78.
185

In re Estate of Kimball, 583 P.2d at 1278 (citations omitted) (“[S]uch decrees may be
attacked, even in a collateral proceeding, in the case of fraud.”).
186

187

Id.; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-2-101.

See Lon V. Smith Found. v. Devon Energy Corp., 2017 WY 121, ¶ 33, 403 P.3d 997, 1007
(Wyo. 2017); supra notes 137– 42 and accompanying text.
188

189

DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 44.

190

See THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 4, § 88.13(a).

191

DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 40.

192

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-1-102(a)(iii).

193

See Lerner, supra note 29, at 304, 321; supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text.
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§ 2-11-201.194 Section 2-11-201 is therefore written in a fashion which serves to
dramatically reduce local court involvement and expenditures during ancillary
administration proceedings, thereby increasing the speed and efficiency with
which title to in-state real property can be transferred.195 Certainly, in comparison
to those states that only offer full ancillary administration to nonresident
estates, this process has substantially reduced cost and time burdens on
nonresidents.196 However, as the foregoing analysis of the principal case
demonstrated, in some cases, this increase in efficiency comes at the expense of
overlooking testamentary intent.197
This problem arises from an interstate conflict between the operation of
§ 2-11-201 and the probate proceedings of other states.198 Since this statute’s
enactment in 1913, the mobility of modern society has significantly increased.199
In response, many states have undertaken modifications of their probate laws to
improve overall efficiency and judicial economy.200 One such modification has
been the amendment of probate proceedings to forgo passing upon out-of-state
real property during formal domiciliary probate.201 Consequently, in states such
as California, Maryland, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas, executors are generally
not required to include foreign real property within the final inventory filed with
their courts.202 These states are thus able to increase judicial economy by avoiding
194

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-11-201; see supra notes 75–87 and accompanying text.

195

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-11-201; see supra notes 149–54 and accompanying text.

196

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-11-201.

197

See supra notes 149– 88 and accompanying text.

See Lon V. Smith Found. v. Devon Energy Corp., 2017 WY 121, 403 P.3d 997 (Wyo.
2017); Lerner, supra note 29, at 321 (“Individual states must realize that probate laws do not operate
in the limited arena of the individual state, but significantly affect the actions of those domiciled in
other states.”); supra notes 149 – 88 and accompanying text.
198

199

See Wilson, supra note 48, § 20:24; supra notes 75– 87 and accompanying text.

200

See THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 4, § 88.13(a).

See, e.g., In re Conservatorship of Estate of Hume, 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 796, 801 n.6 (Cal.
Ct. App 2006) (“Real property located in another state should not be listed on the inventory. It is
handled through ancillary administration.”).
201

BRUCE S. ROSS & JERYLL S. COHEN, CAL. PRAC. GUIDE: PROBATE ¶ 14:290 (2017)
(“California representatives have no authority over property in other states; they are required to
account for, ‘preserve’ and ‘manage’ foreign assets only if and when those assets are delivered to
California and thus become subject to a California administration.”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2115.02 (West 2017) (“[T]he executor or administrator shall file with the court an inventory of
the decedent›s interest in real property located in this state. . . .”) (emphasis added); 20 PA. STAT. AND
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3301 (West 2017) (“Every personal representative shall file with the register
a verified inventory of all real and personal estate of the decedent, except real estate outside of this
Commonwealth”) (emphasis added); TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 309.051 (West 2017) (“The inventory
must . . . include . . . all estate real property located in this state . . . .”) (emphasis added); Randall v.
State, 117 A.3d 91, 119 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2015) (“[I]t is the practice in Maryland that foreign
real property does not need to be included in an inventory for purposes of inclusion in the Maryland
probate estate; however, it must be on the information report.”).
202
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expenditures of local resources to pass decisions upon out-of-state property which,
under the law of situs, would not be binding upon the court wherein the real
property is located nor function as an effective conveyance of title.203
Though certainly beneficial within those states, these amendments have
effectively impaired Wyoming Statute § 2-11-201’s ability to accurately distribute
a decedent’s property to the intended beneficiaries.204 Section 2-11-201’s directive
to the district courts to substitute a foreign state’s procedures as their own
without a review of testamentary intent is illogical when the foreign proceedings
omit any account of the Wyoming real property.205 Nonetheless, in its efforts
to maximize efficiency, Wyoming Statute § 2-11-201 effectively authorizes
Wyoming courts in these circumstances to disregard the testator’s donative
intent and base the Wyoming decree upon foreign proceedings that ultimately
ignore the Wyoming property.206 Although this type of error only has potential
to occur in a select number of cases wherein domiciliary proceedings took place
with conflicting state probate laws, any such occurrence of this nature demands
attention, as “virtually the entire law of wills derives from the premise that an
owner is entitled to dispose of his property as he pleases in death as in life.”207
Though efficiency is an important consideration, freedom of disposition may only
be restricted to the extent that the donor attempts to make a disposition or achieve
a purpose “prohibited by an overriding rule of law.”208 Although the accelerated
procedure § 2-11-201 offers is not without its benefits, expedience should not
override the state’s interest in upholding a testator’s freedom of disposition.209
Moreover, Wyoming’s need to offer ancillary proceedings with such a heavy
efficiency emphasis is substantially reduced given the availability of non-probate
alternatives that achieve the same reduction in court supervision. For example,
when a decedent owns out-of-state property at the time of his death, he can
entirely avoid the need for ancillary administration in that state by placing title

203

SCHOENBLUM, supra note 49, § 26.15.

204

See supra notes 149– 88 and accompanying text.

205

See supra notes 149– 88 and accompanying text.

206

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-11-201 (2017); see supra notes 149– 88 and accompanying text.

John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491
(1975) (“The first principal of the law of wills is freedom of testation.”).
207

208
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 (AM. LAW INST.
2003) (emphasis added) (“American law does not grant courts any general authority to question
the wisdom, fairness, or reasonableness of the donor’s decisions about how to allocate his or her
property.”); see supra note 4 and accompanying text.

Benefits of increased efficiency in this area may include, for example, court proceedings
that are less time consuming and less burdensome on local probate courts, and increased incentive
for nonresidents to purchase Wyoming real property.
209
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to the real property into a revocable inter vivos trust.210 The need for probate is
eliminated because the trustee holds title to the trust property so, upon the death
of the settlor, the trust property is either distributed by the trustee or held in
further trust pursuant to the terms of the trust.211 This non-probate alternative,
therefore, boasts privacy, “continuity, efficiency, and flexibility” to the testator.212
For these reasons, trusts have surpassed wills as the preferred mechanism for
implementing the transfer of property upon death.213 Additionally, a similar result
may be achieved under the effect of a joint tenancy with the right of survivorship
or a “transfer on death” (TOD) deed, wherein title to real property is passed to
another upon death outside of probate.214 In light of these viable alternatives for
testamentary transfers of real property, it is unnecessary to all but remove judicial
oversight from Wyoming’s ancillary probate proceedings because a testator may
voluntarily elect to eliminate such court supervision through utilization of nonprobate mechanisms.215
Lastly, implications concerning the state’s interest in the finality of its probate
orders should be taken into consideration under the expedited procedure of
§ 2-11-201. Because these probate orders act as final judgments, they are treated
the same as any other final judgment within a civil proceeding, and the doctrine
of res judicata will be applied absent an appeal.216 The Wyoming Supreme Court
has examined in great detail the merits of treating these orders as final rather
than interlocutory.217 Like other civil proceedings, probate matters include many

3 J. MARTIN BURKE
ed. 2017).
210

ET AL.,

MODERN ESTATE PLANNING § 37.26 (Matthew Bender ed., 2d

211

DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 45.

212

Averill, The Wyoming Probate Code of 1980, supra note 35, at 178.

213

DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 1, at 385.

Id. at 496 – 97. States that have enacted statutes to allow the transfer of real property by
TOD deed include: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana,
Ohio, Kansas, Missouri, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming. Id. at 497.
214

215

Id. at 496.

See supra notes 172– 87 and accompanying text; 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 931 (2018) (“Res
judicata or claim preclusion operates as a bar to a reassertion of a cause of action which has previously
been adjudicated in a proceeding between the same parties or those in privity with the parties.”);
see also In re Estate of Kimball, 583 P.2d 1274, 1278 (Wyo. 1978) (“[A] decree of distribution, even
though erroneous, becomes final and res judicata in the absence of an appeal or any other timely
challenge to the settlement and distribution decreed thereby.”); Pitzer v. Union Bank of Cal., 9
P.3d 805, 812 (Wash. 2000) (“[T]he law of reopening estates is derived from the law of vacating
judgments.”).
216

217

See In re Estate of Novakovich, 2004 WY 158, ¶¶ 24–26, 101 P.3d 931, 937 (Wyo. 2004).
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parties who may be adversely affected if the original probate decree is altered
after a good faith reliance, such as beneficiaries and creditors.218 Therefore, when
considering the effect of a probate order, a court should be reluctant to disturb
“the sanctity of a closed probate estate.”219
Additionally, notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days after the probate
decree is entered.220 This gives those parties with standing who wish to challenge
the order a relatively short window of time to ensure all dispositions were correct
before the decree becomes final.221 However, § 2-11-201 imposes no requirement
on either the court or the executor to provide notice of the proceedings to the
listed beneficiaries of the Wyoming property other than a general publication in
the local jurisdiction.222 Therefore, if a beneficiary of Wyoming property is not
the entity petitioning for ancillary proceedings, he may only receive constructive,
rather than actual, notice of “the intention of the petitioner to have the probate
proceedings admitted in this state as a probate of the estate.”223 This may impede
a beneficiary’s ability to file a timely appeal with the Wyoming Supreme Court.
Given beneficiaries’ limited opportunity for recourse in the probate context, the
statute’s increased potential for occurrence of error is disconcerting.

C. Legislative Response
On January 11, 2017, shortly after the Natrona County District Court
issued its decision in Lon V. Smith Foundation, House Bill No.123 was introduced
during Wyoming’s 64th General Legislative Session.224 This Bill, sponsored
by Representatives Greear and Pelkey, and Senator Nethercott, proposed an
amendment to Wyoming Statute § 2-11-201.225 As originally proposed, the Bill
would have eliminated the monetary limitation on a nonresident’s property,

218

Id. ¶ 24, 101 P.3d at 937.

Id. ¶ 26, 101 P.3d at 937. This emphasis is not unique to Wyoming. See Reed v. Campbell,
476 U.S. 852, 855–56 (1986). The United States Supreme Court has taken an identical stance
upon the issue. Id. (holding that “[a]fter an estate has been finally distributed, the interest in finality
may provide an additional, valid justification for barring the belated assertion of claims, even though
they may be meritorious and even though mistakes of law or fact may have occurred during the
probate process.”).
219

220

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-2-308 (2017); Wyo. R. App. P. 2.01(a).

221

Wyo. R. App. P. 2.01(a); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-2-308.

222

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-11-201; see supra notes 77– 80 and accompanying text.

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-11-201. Though beneficiaries and heirs are typically notified of a
bequest by mail during primary probate proceedings, no such notice is given under § 2-11-201
upon the initiation of ancillary proceedings. Id.; see also WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-6-209.
223

224
H.B. 123, 64th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2017); The Natrona County District Court’s Order
on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment and Other Pending Motions was filed on October 19, 2016.
Order on Cross Motions, supra note 95, at 3, *3.
225

Wyo. H.B. 123.
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and thereby allowed shortened ancillary probate administration for any
nonresident estate.226 After its introduction, a House committee proposed
amendments to the Bill, which added the requirement of filing a copy of the
will, if any, and an inventory of the Wyoming estate alongside the previously
requested documentation.227
Amended House Bill No.123 passed the House, and the Senate approved
with further amendments of its own.228 The Senate’s amendments would have
introduced an additional section below the first provision to clarify the legislative
intent behind the statute:
Section 2. This act is intended as a clarification of existing law.
The Wyoming legislature intends to make no substantive change
to prior law. This act has always been intended to provide a
simplified procedure for administration of the Wyoming estate
of a nonresident decedent in conformity with the decedent’s
will, if any, or the Wyoming laws of intestacy in the absence of
a will, without regard to how the final decree of distribution of
the other state may have distributed the decedent’s assets located
in the other state . . . .229
The Senate’s additional amendments were sent back to the House, but the House
declined to concur.230 Representative Greear addressed the House and expressed
concern about the Senate’s characterization of these changes as solely clarifications
of prior law, specifically because the deletion of the $200,000 cap was inconsistent
with previous legislative intent.231 For this reason, Representative Greear asked
the members of the House to vote no on the Motion to Concur, so that he could
further discuss this concern with the Senate.232 Thereafter, a joint committee of
three House members and three Senate members was established to discuss the
issue.233 However, the Bill was indefinitely postponed after the joint committee
failed to resolve the issue before the end of the 64th General Legislative Session
on March 3, 2017.234
226

Id.

227

Id.

228

Id. (as amended by S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Feb. 8, 2017).

229

Id.

230

Id.

2017 General Session Archives: Hearing on H.B. 123 Before the H., 64th Leg., Gen. Sess.
(Wyo. 2017) (statement of Rep. Greear), http://legisweb.state.wy.us/2017/audio/house/h021417
am1.mp3.
231

232

Id.

H. JOURNAL, 64th Leg., Gen. Sess. 243– 45 (Wyo. 2017), http://legisweb.state.wy.us/2017/
Digest/HB0123.pdf (digest report on Wyo. H.B. 123).
233

234

Id.
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The legislative intent provision proposed by the Senate that references the
intended operation of § 2-11-201 is contrary to the existing operation of the
statute’s plain language.235 The statute’s language presently directs Wyoming
courts to dispense with holding their own probate proceedings after adopting the
proceedings held in the foreign jurisdiction as original proceedings.236 Inserting
language into the statute which posits that Wyoming proceedings should occur
“without regard to how the final decree of distribution of the other state may
have distributed the decedent’s assets located in the other state” would certainly
constitute a “substantive change to prior law,” and would create further confusion
among the district courts as to the proper procedure for administration of a
foreign estate.237 The foreign decree of distribution is the document that evidences
the foreign jurisdiction’s proceedings in regard to how the estate’s assets should be
distributed—not the will.238 Moreover, in order for the district courts to ensure
Wyoming real property has been distributed “in conformity with the decedent’s
will,” those courts would need to undertake an examination of the will, a process
that would also constitute a “substantive change” to the prior operation of
§ 2-11-201.239 Consequently, the amendments proposed during the 64th
legislative session would have imposed an interpretive hardship upon the state’s
district courts without resolving the issues exposed by the principal case.
Because these issues remain unresolved, the Wyoming legislature should
revisit Wyoming Statute § 2-11-201. However, rather than adding a provision
that explains the legislative intent, the present statutory defects should be cured by
amending the statute to incorporate both the initial amendments proposed by the
House and a review mandate for the district courts. The aggregate amendments
proposed herein would read:
In case of a nonresident’s estate having property in this state,
which estate has been duly probated and settled in another state,
the probate of the estate in this state may be dispensed with
upon filing with the district judge in the proper county a petition
under oath showing the facts in the case together with certified
copies of the petition, the will, if any, order of appointment of
executor or administrator, inventory of the Wyoming estate, final
decree of distribution of estate therein, and a full showing that
debts of the estate have been paid. The district judge, after being
235

See supra notes 149–223 and accompanying text.

236

See supra notes 149–223 and accompanying text.

H.B. 123, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wyo. 2017) (as amended by S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
Feb. 8, 2017).
237

238
Lon V. Smith Found. v. Devon Energy Corp., 2017 WY 121, ¶ 30, 403 P.3d 997, 1007
(Wyo. 2017) (defining “proceeding” as “the regular and orderly progression of a lawsuit, including
all acts and events between the time of commencement and the entry of judgment.”).
239

Wyo. H.B. 123.
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satisfied upon his or her review of the above listed documentation
that the Wyoming property has been properly disposed of, may give
notice by publication for the period of three (3) weeks of the
intention of the petitioner to have the probate proceedings
admitted in this state as a probate of the estate. If on the day set
for hearing on the petition no objection is made, the judge shall
make an order admitting the certified copies of the proceedings
in the estate to record in his court and they shall be considered
and treated from that time as original proceedings in his court
and shall be conclusive evidence of the facts therein shown. If,
upon review, the district judge is not satisfied that the Wyoming
property has been properly disposed of, he or she may redirect the
petitioner to have the will admitted under section 2-11-104.
These amendments would act in several respects to cure the statute’s present
defects while maintaining a simplified, efficient procedure. Currently, § 2-11-201
places the burden squarely upon the petitioner to ensure that the domiciliary
jurisdiction fully and correctly disposed of the Wyoming real property before
filing for distribution under § 2-11-201.240 By adding a mandatory review requirement, this burden would shift to the court, which would verify the Wyoming real
property was properly distributed pursuant to the applicable will, if any, during
the foreign proceedings. If, upon review, the court determines the Wyoming real
property was not distributed properly, the court may then direct the petitioner
to have the nonresident estate admitted under § 2-11-104, whereby testamentary
intent could be discerned through full ancillary proceedings. Although the inclusion
of such a review would increase the level of court supervision and consequently
decrease the speed with which estates can be disposed of, overall efficiency in
comparison to full proceedings would be maintained. The court would simply
be examining documentation submitted, not issuing any substantive judgments
as to the will’s validity or construction. Such determinations within the ancillary
administration context would remain viable only under § 2-11-104.241 Further,
the implementation of judicial scrutiny during this process would provide a
safeguard to interested beneficiaries who may not be in the best position to make
timely assurances of a Wyoming probate decree’s accuracy.242
Therefore, implementing the above amendments to the present language of
Wyoming Statute § 2-11-201 would harmonize Wyoming’s ancillary administration proceedings with other state probate laws and ensure donative intent is
fulfilled to the maximum extent allowed by law. However, in order to maintain
an easily applied and expedited procedure, these amendments would not grant

240

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-11-201 (2017); see supra notes 149–223 and accompanying text.

241

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-11-104.

242

See supra notes 220–23 and accompanying text.
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Wyoming courts any additional authority to make substantive determinations as
to the will’s validity or construction under this section. Enacting a change that
would increase this authority while still ensuring a simplified procedure with fewer
expenditures than full ancillary proceedings would likely require a full reform of
the statute, rather than mere amendment. If the legislature wished to achieve such
a drastic change, an effective method of doing so would be through adoption of
the UPC approach to ancillary administration, which vests greater authority in
the domiciliary state’s personal representative to act within the situs state.243

V. CONCLUSION
The court’s holding in Lon V. Smith Foundation was a correct interpretation
of ancillary probate administration proceedings pursuant to Wyoming Statute
§ 2-11-201.244 Under this statute’s plain language, the Natrona County District
Court was under no directive to conduct an examination of testamentary intent,
nor make its own findings as to whom Mr. Smith’s estate should be distributed.245
Therefore, the foreign decree, which omitted reference to the Wyoming property,
stood as the basis for distribution of the estate.246 As the foregoing analysis
demonstrated, when § 2-11-201 is applied in conjunction with other state
probate statutes, a testator’s freedom of disposition may be undermined by the
issuance of a conflicting decree.247 Such an outcome occurs from realizing the
state’s interest in efficient probate proceedings at the expense of making accurate
estate distributions.248 Any conflict of this nature should be resolved in favor of
upholding the state’s greater interest in fulfilling a testator’s intent.249 Therefore,
the language of Wyoming Statute § 2-11-201 should be updated to comport with
changes in the operation of probate law around the country.250 These changes
can be achieved by amending the statute require the district courts to conduct a
review of the foreign decree in comparison with the testator’s will.251

See UNIF. PROBATE CODE Art. IV (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010); Lerner, supra note 29;
Stevens, supra note 27, at 310, 333–39 (discussing further the mechanics of the UPC approach to
ancillary administration). Adoption of the UPC approach would have the supplemental benefit of
harmonizing Wyoming probate procedures with other jurisdictions, particularly in the surrounding
UPC states. See Stephen M. Brainerd, Multi-Jurisdictional Matters, in COLORADO ESTATE PLANNING
HANDBOOK § 36.2 (2014) (“If the situs has a simplified proceeding, such as that prescribed by
Article IV of the UPC, the ancillary administration may be accomplished by domiciliary counsel
with little or no assistance from counsel in the foreign jurisdiction.”).
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See supra notes 149– 88 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 149– 88 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 149– 88 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 224– 43 and accompanying text.
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